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Abstract: 
 
We contrast the influence of demography and central bank independence on inflation. 
The recent demographic trends in developed countries are shown to weight more on 
inflation than central bank independence, while the contrary stands for the period from 
1960 to 1979. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since the 1980s, in most of the OECD countries, the increase in the proportion of middle aged 
people and retirees has been accompanied by a reduction in inflation, and by monetary 
policies geared towards low inflation. This reveals differences in inflation aversion across 
generations1, a fact that can easily be explained. For example, in France and the United States, 
retired people hold around 2.5 times more Treasury bonds than the working population, and 
they are about three times less indebted.2 No wonder retirees' inflation aversion is higher than 
the young's one. 
 
It is also remarkable that, at least since the last two decades, central bank independence has 
been considered as a quick fix against inflation, a relation that stands robustly for developed 
countries (see e.g. Brumm, 2002). 
 
However, if central bank independence is a solution to a society's inflationary bias, and if 
older generations have higher degrees of inflation aversion, then the sheer fact of ageing 
should strongly weight on inflation. In which case, the negative relationship between inflation 
and central bank independence may no longer stand, once one considers demographic trends 
in the estimated equation. 
 
Most of the empirical studies revealing the negative relation between central bank 
independence and inflation have been conducted in the 1990s, considering the 1960-1990 
period. Yet, this period includes a first phase when baby-boomers have started to consume 
and contract debts and a second phase, when they have started to fret about the protection of 
their savings. Hence, the coefficients on central bank independence may have captured (and in 
fact hidden) changes in populations' preferences. 
 
The question we here consider is thus: is the impact of central bank independence different in 
ageing societies? We test for the respective influences of central bank independence and 
demography on inflation for developed countries, considered under the 1960-1994 period. 
This period is the one for which central bank independence indexes have been shown to be 
the most influential (see notably Cukierman, 1992), permitting a direct comparison of our 
results with the literature. The conclusion however contains lessons to be drawn for the 
following periods.  
 
The following section deals with the data sources and methods. The third section presents the 
results, while the last concludes. 
 
                                                 
1 Shiller (1997) even shows that intergenerational differences in inflation aversion are more important than 
international ones. 
2 Data for France available from the INSEE website 
(http://www.insee.fr/fr/ppp/ir/accueil.asp?page=transm04/doc/documentation.htm); data for the US from the 
2004 Survey of Consumer Finances. See Bucks et al. (2006). 
 3
 
2. Data and method 
 
We estimate a reduced form model close to Lindh and Malmbergh (1998), where inflation is 
explained by five age group shares of the population: 15-29 years old, 30-49 years, 50-64 
years, 65-74 years and 75 years and above3. 
 
We add to this equation a Central Bank Independence (CBI) index in order to distinguish 
between the influence of the latter and the part played by the elderly in the disinflation 
process. We also include a quadratic term for the elderly, to account for potential non-
linearities in the relationship.  
 
Eventually, we add two control variables traditionally used in the literature, namely an output 
variable and the openness rate of the economy. For an increase in the output gap is expected 
to create additional inflationary pressures. And, conversely, the extra competitive pressure 
related to openness has been shown to exert a negative influence on prices. 
 
The estimated equation is:  
75+
2
it 0 age it quadr it cbi i g it or it it
age=15-29
infl =β + β (age share) +β (share_75plus) +β CBI +β g +β or +ε         (1)∑  
where indexes i and t refer respectively to country and year, gt is the output gap, computed as 
the difference between real output and potential output, divided by potential output. The latter 
has been generated using a Hodrick-Prescott filter, with a smoothing parameter equal to 100, 
as recommended by Hodrick and Prescott (1997) for annual data. orit is the openness rate, 
defined as the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP. The use of country-fixed 
effects is de facto impossible, since we use Cukierman's (1992) time invariant CBI index. He 
computed this index from the central bank charters of the 1980s and covers independence for 
the whole period. The use of the same index for the whole period is usual in the literature 
since the case for independence has been made (Alesina and Summers, 1993). For comparison 
purposes, we will also run regressions excluding the CBI index, in order to point out the exact 
influence of age structure on inflation: 
 
75+
2
it 0 age it quadr it g it or it it
age=15-29
infl =β + β (age share) +β (share_75plus) +β g +β or +ε                      (2)∑  
 
We use annual data of consumer price index (CPI), of real GDP, exports and imports for 20 
OECD countries4, all from the International Monetary Fund (International Financial 
Statistics). Age distribution data are from the United Nations population report (2004). Since 
age data refer to end-of-the year estimates, the inflation variable is constructed as inflation in 
year t equal to log(CPIt+1/CPIt). 
 
Estimates are performed over the 1960-1994 period, because it covers the ones used in most 
of the literature on the effects of central bank independence (see Hayo and Hefeker, 2002). To 
test for the changing relationship between inflation and age structure/CBI index, we divide 
our sample period in three sub-periods: 1960-1972 (significant but controlled inflation), 1973-
                                                 
3 Motivations for the suppression of the 0-14 year old share are provided by Lindh and Malmberg (1998). 
4 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, New 
Zealand, Norway, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States. 
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1979 (stagflation) and 1980-1994 (sustained disinflation). Besides their obvious economic 
foundations, Hausman/Wald tests5 support their relevance6. 
 
 
3. Results 
 
Preliminary investigations pointed out two problems. Firstly, Greece and Portugal appear as 
consistent outliers according to current mean/standard deviation criteria for the 1980-1994 
period. Interestingly, no significant presence of outliers could be highlighted by the same 
criteria or the Hadi (1994) test for the two other sub-periods, or for the whole 1960-1994 
period, apart from one or two observations. Secondly, a potential endogeneity problem has to 
be considered. Indeed, while both Hausman and Nakamura-Nakamura tests7 accept the 
hypothesis of exogeneity for age shares and CBI index, they support strong evidence of 
endogeneity for the output gap and the openness rate. Instrumenting the output gap and the 
openness rate with their own lags and estimating by two stage least square (2SLS) provided 
an adequate solution8. Depending of the considered sub-periods, the number of lags used as 
instruments turned out to be two or three9. Finally, residuals have been corrected for 
heteroskedasticity using the White estimator of variance, and for autocorrelation using 
Bartlett kernel (Newey-West)-based estimations.  
 
The results appear in Table 1. Interestingly, they differ depending on the period / sub-period 
considered, revealing a varying impact of central bank independence and of age cohorts on 
inflation. For each period and sub-period, we report estimates for equations (1) and (2). We 
first compare the results for the whole period to those for the sub-periods, and then focus on 
the switches revealed by sub-periods analyses. 
 
----- Insert Table 1 here ----- 
 
First column in Table 1 shows the results for the whole 1960-1994 period. The set of age 
structure variables and the central bank independence index are significant with signs 
conform to economic intuition. The two control variables are also almost always significant 
and rightly signed, i.e. positive for the output gap and negative for the openness rate. 
 
Furthermore, the influence of the different age shares is qualitatively identical over the global 
period and the sub-periods, except for the 15-29 category. For this class, the influence on 
inflation turns negative in the 1973-1979 sub-periods. Though young adults are likely to 
consume more than save, in these years their behavior has probably been credit-constrained 
and/or, for those already in debts, their attention has probably been brought to inflation10. It is 
also worth emphasizing that these outcomes are qualitatively very similar to the ones of Lindh 
                                                 
5 More details upon these tests available from the authors on request. 
6 An observation on non-stationarity concerns. The current panel unit root tests (Levin and Lin, 2002; Im et al., 
2003; Maddala and Wu, 1999) often disagree on the persistence of the data, so that it would not be clear whether 
the variables in (1)/(2) are indeed integrated or co-integrated, whatever Pedroni’s (2001) panel cointegration test 
would tell. Besides, the sub-periods we are considering are too short (5 to 14 years) for imposing any meaningful 
restrictions. We can therefore perform estimations in levels, since we are de facto interested in the short-term 
relationships between inflation and right-hand side variables. 
7 Results are available from the authors upon request. 
8 Moreover, a relatively small number of lags for the instruments minimizes the potential small sample bias that 
may arise when too many overidentifying restrictions are imposed. 
9 Hansen overidentification test did not reject our sets of instruments. Complete results available upon request. 
10 This phenomenon probably contributes to explain their subsequent fear of inflation. 
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and Malmbergh (1998), except for the share “75 and more”. Though correctly signed, the 
share of the elderly does not significantly impact inflation on the whole period, whereas the 
CBI index displays the expected significant negative impact. 
 
Turning to sub-periods analysis (columns (2) to (4)), it is striking to see that in the first two 
sub-periods, some age structure variables and central bank independence are both strongly 
significant. Everything thus happens, in the first two sub-periods, as if societies had to protect 
themselves from inflationary pressures. This result stands with Farvaque (2002), that 
inflation-adverse-societies build institutions fitting their feelings. Hence, during the period 
under review, central bank independence clearly appears as a rational institutional choice, 
adopted by inflation adverse societies confronted with rising inflationary pressures. 
 
However, demography appears to dominate the influence of institutional frameworks over the 
1980-1994 sub-period. Central bank independence is now insignificant, while the weight of 
the retirees on inflation is strongly significant and negatively signed. These results show that 
independence is no longer so strongly needed when people have matured enough to resist the 
siren's song of inflation. 
 
Concerning the non-linear impact of the share of elderly, as shown in Table 1, the case for 
non-linearity is not overwhelming. The coefficient of the squared share of the elderly is in 
most cases negative but non-significant, and when significant (for the last sub-period, 1980-
1994), it is only at the 10 % level.  
 
To check the robustness of these results, we undertake several sensitivity checks. First, 
including over the last sub-period dummy variables for European Monetary System 
membership and the adoption of inflation targeting frameworks for some countries delivered 
similar results. Second, using GDP growth instead of output gap brings quantitative identical 
results, while sometimes affecting very marginally the significance. More interestingly, 
controlling for intra-group correlation11 leads to only one major change in the results: for the 
whole period 1960-1994, the coefficient on CBI index becomes clearly non-significant (t-stat 
equal to -0.87), confirming the role of age as a better and stronger predictor of inflation. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
As shown by Forder (2005), the belief in the benefits of central bank independence has spread 
quickly, and policymakers and politicians have endorsed the idea. In the years following the 
sample period under study, central banks have even become more independent.  
 
As the countries in our sample have seen their people becoming older, they may have 
transformed their institutions beyond what is now required. However, institutions should exist 
to serve not just the current, but also the future generations. And, should the latter become 
more numerous, younger, and more turbulent, they would appreciate the bequest of central 
bank independence. 
 
 
                                                 
11 Intra-group correlation means that the error terms are correlated within groups, but not across groups. 
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Table 1: Inflation explained by age shares, CBI, output gap and openness rate 
 
  1960-1994 1960-1972 1973-1979 1980-1994 
 2SLS, HAC residuals 2SLS, HAC residuals 2SLS, HAC residuals 2SLS, HAC residuals 
Dep. var. infl. with CBI no CBI with CBI no CBI with CBI no CBI with CBI no CBI 
                
Constant 0,056 0,056 -0,020 0,118 0,543 0,661 0,423 0,417 
 1,120 1,120 -0,220 1,320 3,310 3,930 3,770 4,000 
shr_15_29 0,472 0,461 0,449 0,277 -0,960 -1,116 -0,223 -0,206 
 4,260 4,170 3,190 1,990 -3,490 -4,260 -1,040 -1,070 
shr_30_49 -0,606 -0,605 -0,404 -0,411 -0,836 -0,950 -0,972 -0,962 
 -7,190 -7,090 -2,520 -2,520 -3,200 -3,760 -5,960 -6,340 
shr_50_64 -0,075 -0,064 -0,433 -0,319 -0,125 0,292 0,014 0,011 
 -0,440 -0,390 -2,730 -2,010 -0,290 0,560 0,090 0,070 
shr_65_74 1,841 1,940 2,075 1,698 0,768 0,587 1,463 1,437 
 5,820 6,040 3,700 2,850 0,820 0,550 4,270 4,330 
shr_75plus -0,655 -1,255 3,086 -3,341 3,572 -2,112 -4,259 -4,171 
 -0,690 -1,330 0,980 -1,320 0,840 -0,500 -2,830 -2,860 
square75 -5,364 -0,548 -67,600 21,039 -69,571 -11,489 23,476 23,035 
 -0,650 -0,070 -1,520 0,600 -1,540 -0,240 1,890 1,880 
cuk8094 -0,027 - -0,055 - -0,075 - 0,004 - 
 -2,100 - -3,610 - -2,900 - 0,350 - 
output gap 0,640 0,640 0,413 0,415 0,773 0,755 0,357 0,357 
 5,790 5,800 3,680 3,830 3,480 3,320 5,200 5,200 
or -0,023 -0,023 -0,001 0,003 -0,066 -0,060 -0,016 -0,016 
  -3,450 -3,360 -0,120 0,370 -4,650 -4,150 -2,430 -2,410 
N 630 630 164 164 134 134 283 283 
Centered R² 0,363 0.356 0,345 0.278 0,538 0,500 0,536 0,535 
 t-statistics in italic. 2SLS indicates that all regressions have been performed using two-stage least squares. HAC means that t-statistics have been 
computed from White/Newey_West estimates of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. 
